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  Chapter 1: Introduction  
In the field of political science, India stands out as a case that does not fit into 
existing models of thought on the nature of a state and defies ease of understanding. India 
is most often considered to be a subsidy state, one that gives subsidies freely and is 
characterized by corruption and wastage of funds. However, I show in this thesis the 
notion of the subsidy state does not capture the true nature of the Indian state. India is in 
fact a developmental state. States have typically been thought have either state-led 
development (as in communist regimes) or in a more hands-off style facilitated by 
economic growth, as in a developed country like the US; what makes India different is 
that it tries to combine the two styles to form a third, unique alternative. It seems easier to 
criticize the Indian model, then, rather than unpack it and try to make sense of it. 
It is true that India is afflicted by the problems of corruption scandals and 
numerous other problems in governance. In 2011, many Indian citizens actually joined 
social activist Anna Hazare in anticorruption protests and pushed for reforms.1 Ironically, 
while these protests suggested that corruption was on the rise, India’s Chief Economic 
Adviser Raghuram Rajan was quoted saying that it was not the case that India was seeing 
a rise in corruption, but rather, “it is just that the opportunities for corruption have 
increased” as a result of liberalization and continued economic growth.2 Unfortunately, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See for example this article. Vaishnav, Milan. “India Needs More Democracy, Not Less The Case for 
More Bureaucrats, Institutions, and Voting.” Foreign Affairs, April 11, 2013. 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139157/milan-vaishnav/india-needs-more-democracy-not-less> 
2 ENS Economic Bureau. “Creating more job opportunities in services can spur growth to 8%.” Indian 
Express, February 9, 2013.  <http://m.indianexpress.com/news/creating-more-job-opportunities-in-services-
can-spur-growth-to-8-/1071689/> 
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this kind of view that sees the problem of corruption being rooted in increased 
opportunities for corruption oversimplifies the complex nature of Indian citizen-state 
relations; corruption is not simply driven by increased economic opportunity and 
economic self-interest, but also the unique relationship between the Indian government 
and the constituents of each state. It is widely known that India has a huge number of 
schemes (welfare and developmental programs – 1259, at the time of this writing), which 
are necessary in part because of the sheer size of the Indian state. However, whether or 
not the Indian state is a subsidy state, as suggested by many newspaper articles, has never 
been properly examined. The assumption is that India is a subsidy state, but actually, 
there do not seem to be any studies that try to aggregate all the government schemes and 
analyze precisely whether Indian schemes are merely subsidies or something more.3 Nor 
has any analysis of the nature of Indian schemes been done via the lens of expenditure, 
which would compare subsidy spending to developmental spending, to understand 
whether or not India is, in fact, a subsidy state or a developmental one. Usually the 
examination of expenditure is tied to specific types of subsidies – fertilizer and oil being 
among the two largest subsidies and therefore the most scrutinized. Most scholarly 
articles seem to discuss particular Indian schemes or certain groups of subsidies, but 
unless the expenditure of subsidy programs can be compared to other developmental 
schemes in aggregate, it would be unfair to conclude India is a subsidy state. Moreover, 
subsidies can and do have a developmental impact, which raises a question of what a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See an example of the usage of the term “subsidy raj” here: Iqbal, Javid. “Subsidy Raj: not a lasting 
phenomenon.” Rising Kashmir, January 21, 2013. <http://www.risingkashmir.in/news/subsidy-raj-not-a-
lasting-phenomenon-40407.aspx> 
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subsidy is and how one would differentiate between subsidy and developmental schemes 
that offer other types of benefits.  	  
The objective of this paper, then, is to try to fill one of those gaps by aggregating 
and analyzing centrally sponsored schemes. I opted to select centrally sponsored 
schemes, as I felt analyzing those schemes would suggest something about the 
relationship between the central government and the populace at large. India is ethnically 
heterogeneous; each state is unique in part because of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural 
differences. I felt that analyzing state-sponsored schemes would require studying the 
unique dynamics surrounding of the relationship between citizens and state-level leaders 
within each state to fully understand and explain any findings. The aim of this paper is to 
instead try to draw some generalizations about the relationship between the Indian state 
and its citizens more generally to see how this impacts India’s developmental objectives. 
Specifically, I am trying to determine whether or not the Indian state is actually a subsidy 
state or a developmental one, though I hope that it might also shed some light on the 
nature of the relationship between the Indian state and its citizens even more generally, 
since it is not well-understood via other models that often hold true for developed states. 
In doing so, I hope that my findings will at least give scholars reason to re-evaluate the 
different labels ascribed to developing nations (for example, ‘subsidy state’) to see if 
those labels are still, if at all, accurate. Moreover, India is not the only large developing 
state, and the lessons that can be learned from understanding the relationship between the 
state and the citizenry and how that affects the formation of developmental policy choices 
can be applied elsewhere.  	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Sen (1999) argues in his book Development as Freedom that India should be 
considered a developmental state. He discusses what he calls “unfreedom,” where people 
around the world lack the freedom to survive, to be healthy, to have access to functional 
health care or educational systems, and so on (Sen 1999, 15). He challenges the 
understanding of poverty, saying that, “poverty must be seen as the deprivation of basic 
capabilities rather than merely as lowness of incomes” (Sen 1999, 87). Accordingly, the 
developmental process is intended to enhance the capabilities of such ‘unfree’ persons; 
ideally, developmental programs should work to improve the incomes of people while 
also enhancing their basic capability to live long, healthy lives. Especially in the modern 
day, there seems to be a fixation with economic growth rates as a measure of the health or 
performance of states, and India is often held up against China for comparison. However, 
Sen clearly articulates that growth is important, but not only as an end in itself. Growth 
also matters as a means of development, as a way of facilitating the process of 
development by which people move from unfreedom toward freedom (Sen 1999, 37). 
This paper will use this understanding of developmental objectives – a part of the process 
of growth and also a process of enhancing the capabilities and freedoms of citizens – to 
re-evaluate whether or not India should be characterized as a developmental state.	  
One critical argument to this paper is that the term ‘subsidy’ is widely used but 
not well understood and therefore misapplied, at least in the case of India. Many existing 
definitions capture the economic aspects of subsidies, but none actually capture the 
developmental aspects that are also important in enhancing capability and freedom. 
Consequently, there is a lack of clarity in the role of subsidies with respect to both growth 
and development. Take, for example, this definition from The Economist (2013):	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“Money paid, usually by government, to keep prices below what they would be in 
a free market, or to keep alive businesses that would otherwise go bust, or to 
make activities happen that otherwise would not take place. Subsidies can be a 
form of protectionism by making domestic goods and services artificially 
competitive against imports. By distorting markets, they can impose large 
economic costs.” 
 Of course, all of the above is true – subsidies are often money paid by the 
government, and they do have the ability to distort markets. This is the case even in India, 
but there is more to this than meets the eye. Let us consider one other definition offered 
by Investopedia (2013) before discussing what is missing: 
“A benefit given by the government to groups or individuals usually in the form 
of a cash payment or tax reduction. The subsidy is usually given to remove some 
type of burden and is often considered to be in the interest of the public. Politics 
play an important part in subsidization…. There are many forms of subsidies 
given out by the government, including welfare payments, housing loans, student 
loans and farm subsidies.” 
Both of these widely available definitions describe a subsidy as being in the form 
of money. The Investopedia (2013) definition is slightly more helpful with its definition, 
suggesting that subsidies alleviate some unspecified burden and improve social welfare. 
Here, Sen (1999) would probably argue that the burden, presumably poverty, is not 
merely a burden, but a restriction of freedom, poverty not of income but of capability. 
Something both definitions fail to capture is that subsidies are not always in the form of 
money; also missing is that subsidies can have a positive developmental impact in the 
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long run. The focus of the definitions is instead on the economic costs of such policies, 
which could be perceived as a negative thing. Many of India’s welfare schemes do offer 
money, but they also offer numerous other benefits – development of infrastructure, 
training, and employment opportunities. The understanding that Indian schemes have 
these additional benefits are lost when India is called a ‘subsidy state,’ especially 
considering that nobody has studied what portion of schemes offer subsidies, and how 
much of the scheme is a monetary versus other type of benefits. Furthermore, if the 
subsidies have a positive developmental impact, then it is even more of a problem that 
India has a reputation as a subsidy state; the negative connotation does disservice to the 
term subsidy – since all subsidies do not have to be wasteful expenditure – and to the 
image of the Indian state, which undertakes programs to improve the welfare of its 
citizens. Subsidies are traditionally considered to distort the market and therefore impose 
economic costs. However, if subsidies are not merely a wasteful transfer of funds that are 
siphoned away by corrupt officials instead of reaching the intended beneficiaries, but are 
instead understood to have a positive developmental impact, then that means that 
subsidies (as well as other benefits delivered by government programs) also enhance the 
capability of people to engage in markets. If that is true, then subsidies may have a short 
term cost on the market, but in the long run, they could generate economic benefits since 
more people would be able to better engage in markets and therefore contribute to 
economic growth. Underperforming subsidy schemes should not speak for the choice of 
subsidies and other developmental policies at large; not all subsidies are the same, and it 
is only possible to analyze the developmental impact of subsidies by disaggregating 
them. 
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Bearing in mind this expanded understanding of the capability of subsidies to 
have a positive developmental impact, this paper will try to analyze whether or not India 
should rightly be called a subsidy state, or if the understanding should be shifted to 
developmental state. Chapter two of this paper will look at various models of 
understanding the nature of the Indian state and draw out three essential features: 
competing interest groups, how economic liberalization facilitates corruption and works 
against India’s aim of equalizing the capabilities and freedoms of all its citizens, and the 
role of the Indian state in development and how the failure to engage its citizens in the 
process has resulted in the current system. Chapter three looks at subsidies and cash 
transfers, discussing the problem of targeting and the design of programs. Cash transfers, 
especially conditional cash transfers, have received a lot of good press compared to 
subsidies, though they actually fall prey to many similar problems. Moreover, conditional 
cash transfers require infrastructure, which India is lacking; therefore, while certain 
aspects of the design of schemes needs to be improved, which requires a revision of 
strategy and execution, conditional cash transfers are not yet appropriate for wide-scale 
use in India and should be avoided as a primary means of facilitating capability 
enhancement. In the fourth chapter, I share the methodology I used to categorize 581 
centrally sponsored schemes. I primarily used the description page for each individual 
scheme to determine the target groups of the schemes; identify the owner (state) 
associated with the scheme; determine if the benefits of the scheme were conditional, i.e. 
that the receipt is contingent upon any contribution or action on the part of the 
beneficiary; identify the different types of benefits provided, such as money or 
development of infrastructure; and identify relevant policy areas, such as health or 
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education. The policy areas are especially revealing and make it easier to believe that the 
aim of the Indian state is to promote development and capability enhancement rather than 
squandering money. In the conclusion of this paper, I discuss how my findings on the 
nature of the Indian state suggest that cash transfers are generally not an appropriate 
policy choice in India due to a lack of infrastructure. Therefore, although many schemes 
contain monetary benefits, money is not always the primary benefit; several other types 
of benefits are offered in tandem with smaller monetary transfers. Based on this finding, I 
think calling India a subsidy state is indeed inappropriate, and a closer look is required at 
the Indian budget to see what portion of central government spending goes into monetary 
subsidies versus other types of benefits. 
Chapter 2: On the Nature of the Indian State 
 There are a number of models and theories proposed by scholars in an effort to 
understand the nature of statehood. However, India is unique in that it does not neatly fit 
into previous models created to understand the nature of the government or the continued 
existence of democracy. Many scholars have offered competing explanations for how to 
characterize the Indian developmental state, especially considering its reputation as a 
subsidy regime.4 Each scholar concludes that India is a soft state, a state that is overly 
responsive to various interest groups. This over-responsiveness takes the forms of 
subsidy schemes, which are often designed and/or implemented poorly. As a result, many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The terminology of “subsidy raj” has also appeared in newspapers. For a recent example, see, Iqbal, 
Javid. “Subsidy Raj: not a lasting phenomenon.” Rising Kashmir, January 21, 2013. 
http://www.risingkashmir.in/news/subsidy-raj-not-a-lasting-phenomenon-40407.aspx  
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programs created in the name of alleviating poverty and improving the life of the 
common man have met with little success, which in turn gives subsidies a bad reputation. 
Compared to other developing countries, India is considered to be a developmental 
failure, under the assumption that the scores of developmental schemes produced over the 
years have had little positive impact. In this section, I will look at five perspectives on the 
Indian state to understand the relationship between the state and various actors; several 
authors suggest that interest groups play a definitive role, while some authors take the 
role of interest groups a step further and explain how can be a cause of corruption. A 
third distinct perspective tries to look at the role of the Indian state from a more top-down 
perspective and touches on the policy choices of the government. 
The first perspective offered is that of Pranab Bardhan (2001), who rightly sees 
that India’s state-led development up until the early 1980s was driven by the desire for 
equity. The Indian society is fragmented by caste, class, and by ethnic and cultural 
diversity between Indian states. Accordingly, the Indian government has tried to 
overcome the inequities between groups, though the end result has been that the Indian 
state has become far too focused on being equitable rather than efficient. Bardhan (2001) 
discusses this problem in terms of three primary groups that interact with the Indian state: 
economic interest groups, caste groups, and regional collectives. Economic interest 
groups are groups such as dominant classes as well as smaller groups like manual 
workers or small traders. Though these groups all “speak in the name of the poor,” they 
actually lobby for the interest of their own respective groups (Bardhan 2001, 227). 
Bardhan’s (2001) criticism here is that because there are not large, homogenous interest 
groups in India, many smaller ones clamor to share “the spoils of the system” (Bardhan 
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2001, 228). In a way, this is Krueger’s (1974) argument about a rent-seeking society, 
where the government is caught between restricting entry to the system (and thereby 
favoring the groups that can successfully enter), or between allowing competitive rent-
seeking (such as lobbying) to occur and therefore being more equitable. It seems that 
India allows for competitive rent-seeking to occur at least in part because it is beholden to 
numerous groups in society for political survival. At both the central and state level, the 
Indian government cannot risk falling out of favor with any groups, particularly poorer 
groups. As a result, it responds fairly quickly to even mild pressure by providing groups 
with implicit and explicit subsidies – giving the rent-seeker access to the spoils of the 
system – and perpetuates the wastage of more government funds and accumulates debt, 
since allocations made this way may not be optimally designed to also have a significant 
and positive developmental impact. Moreover, this further sharpens the divide between 
the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots,’ further perpetuating rent-seeking behavior and the effort to 
preserve access to privilege. Given all this, it seems, then, that the Indian government 
may actually be one that is too soft, where the over-responsiveness actually encourages 
more groups to form and engage in rent-seeking in an attempt to capture benefits from 
the government. It is a vicious cycle that continues, and thus the Indian state becomes 
burdened with debt in the name of equity rather than creating a strong, efficient state. 
Economic interest groups are not the only group lobbying for spoils; caste groups 
also clamor for governmental redistributive policies. Bardhan (2001) likens the support of 
caste groups to the infant-industry argument, where essentially, it becomes unclear how 
long a group requires protection. Indeed, more often than not, protectionist policies don’t 
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encourage development or maturation.5 Bardhan (2001) suggests that rather than policies 
like job quotas (focusing on equality of opportunity), the Indian government would do 
better to promote policies like scholarships and job training for specific groups to 
promote equality of outcome (Bardhan 2001, 233). This again highlights the 
government’s drive towards improving equity, though the means by which it attempts to 
do this needs to be rethought. As with economic interest groups, the Indian government is 
politically sensitive to the desires of caste groups, thereby giving into their demands. 
However, the Indian government may need to shift its perspective; rather than giving into 
caste groups’ pressure for protectionist-type policies, it should focus more on creating 
better programs to support all disadvantaged groups in this way. As I will discuss in the 
next chapter, targeting very large groups is not always effective in reaching the intended 
beneficiaries, and therefore, more universal programs would not only have a higher 
developmental impact, but it could potentially also alleviate pressure from more and 
more groups who feel entitled to the government’s support while benefitting a larger 
segment of society. 
The final group Bardhan (2001) discusses are collectives at the regional level. The 
relationship between caste groups and the state has led to caste-based quotas and 
reservations in numerous areas of life – governance, bureaucracy, higher education – 
which gives way to corruption and further abuse of the current redistributive system. For 
example, low-caste Ministers of Parliament (MPs) have been known to transfer away 
upper-caste bureaucrats and replace them with bureaucrats of the same caste as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For a discussion of protectionist policies, see Bhagwati, Jagdish. “Free Trade: Old and New Challenges.” 
The Economic Journal, Vol. 104, No. 423. (Mar., 1994), pp. 231-246 and Carbaugh, Robert and Prante, 
Tyler. “The Temptation for Protectionism and American Trade Policy.” World Economics, Vol. 11, No. 3, 
July–September 2010. 
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themselves – which may equalize that caste group’s political representation, but may not 
be most efficient, especially if the persons installed are not qualified. Another example of 
corruption comes from job security. Often times, when workers are appointed according 
to quotas, their job security is not linked to performance, which acts as a disincentive to 
actually perform any duties. In such a situation, equity of one group comes at a social loss 
of efficiency and equity across groups. As mentioned with caste groups, what India needs 
to do is find a way to reconcile equity, efficiency, and good governance instead of being 
at the mercy of various interest groups.  
Ashutosh Varshney (1998) specifically discusses how and why democracy 
survives in India. He highlights four factors: the historical legacy of the British, economic 
factors, the ethnic makeup of Indian society, and enlightened political leadership; of these 
four factors, I will primarily discuss the economic factors. Like Bardhan (2001), 
Varshney (1998) also notes that poorer groups (low castes and other disadvantaged 
groups) are developing greater political strength. He, however, underlines the fact that 
this is being done through the existing political institutions – preserved post-
independence as Indians rose up against the oppressive British rulers rather than the 
democratic system they had installed. While working through the existing institutions 
contributes to the stability of the Indian state and thereby strengthening the democracy, 
the fact that it is done by a number of small, fragmented groups plays a part in 
perpetuating inefficiency. Still, this may be a better choice for India as it ambles along 
the developmental path rather than being authoritarian like China. 
Varshney (1998) also discusses the factor of economics in the survival of 
democracy in India as it relates to equity. Typically, it is assumed that industrialization 
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(resulting from the commercialization of agriculture) and the creation of wealth and the 
middle class are pre-requisites for democracy.6 However, India has not fit in these 
models; it has been a poor state for decades, and it became a democratic state in 1947 
while remaining fairly unindustrialized thanks to the British. Although an economic crisis 
triggered economic liberalization in 1991, exacerbating socio-economic inequalities 
somewhat, the consumption-based model of growth has prevented the gap from growing 
too wide.7 Compared to states like Brazil, then, India has been able to successfully 
implement reforms, and has been able to do so gradually in order to have less dramatic 
effects on the social fabric of Indian society.  
An additional layer of complexity is added to the problem of economic inequality 
when one realizes that India’s ethnic diversity is localized geographically, which is one 
factor that makes India state-nation rather than a nation-state.8 This geographic 
organization of ethnic groups facilitates asymmetrical or  “holding together” federalism; 
different states and constituencies have different demands of the central government, and 
therefore establish different relationships with the center.9 While the problem of 
inequality across economic caste, class, or ethnicity should not be dismissed, India would 
do better to focus on ways of enhancing the capabilities of all disadvantaged people to 
bring about increased equality of economic outcomes, as Bardhan (2001) suggests, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See a full discussion of this in Moore, Barrington. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 
Boston: Beacon Press Books, 1966, Chapters 7, 8, 9, pp. 413-483 and Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some 
Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, March 1959, pp. 69-105. 
7 See Das, Gurcharan. “The India Model.” Foreign Affairs, Volume 85, No. 4, July/August 2006, pp.  2-16. 
8 See Stepan, Alfred, Linz, Juan, and Yadav, Yogendra. “India as a State Nation: Shared Political 
Community Amidst Deep Cultural Diversity,” in Stepan et al. Crafting State- Nations: India and Other 
Multinational Democracies. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2011. 
9 See Stepan, Alfred, Linz, Juan, and Yadav, Yogendra. “India as a State Nation: Shared Political  
Community Amidst Deep Cultural Diversity,” in Stepan et al. Crafting State- Nations:  India and Other 
Multinational Democracies. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2011, p.46. 
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instead of working through a number of small, fragmented interest groups who are often 
among the more economically disadvantaged in the system. The Indian government has, 
to date, pursued pro-poor policies targeted to specific groups in the form of subsidies in 
an attempt to reduce inequity, though as this paper discusses later, this has not always 
been successful. 
A third scholar, Robert Wade (1985), departs from the previous two scholars, who 
both look at the relationship and nature of the Indian state in terms of the relationship it 
has with interest groups. Wade (1985) focuses on the nature of the Indian state vis a vis 
the bureaucracy. He highlights that there is a sort of “internal labor market” wherein 
bureaucrats, mostly at lower levels of government, bribe officials to be transferred more 
favorable positions (Wade 1985, 484). In the instances that the levels of corruption 
become too high, it is possible that there will be public protest, compelling elected 
representatives, who need the public’s votes, to try to force the official with transferring 
powers to reign in the levels of corruption. Ironically, with the way the system works, an 
ideal system is not one with no corruption but one that sustains a minimum level of 
corruption, since an official who is too strict could also be accused of corruption because 
“he is holding out for more money than [the bureaucrats] are prepared to offer”  (Wade 
1985, 470). 
Wade (1985) highlights the four features of corruption in the administrative 
apparatus: there is internal market corruption (1) that is institutionalized and predictable 
(2), in that the most favorable posts go to the highest bidder. This occurs in a centralized 
system (3) - that is, only one system exists, from top to bottom, that facilitates both 
administrative and political corruption (4) (Wade 1985, 484). Wade (1985) suggests that 
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the makeup of Indian society – which, as explained previously, is both hierarchical and 
heterogeneous – predisposes the administrative and political system to corruption because 
of the competition for scarce resources, the regulatory and allocative functions of the 
state, and a historically prominent bureaucracy. As such, this means that powerful 
individual actors or interest groups can curry the favor of officials (and vice versa) by 
bribing them to get what they want. This view supports the views proposed by Bardhan 
(2001), Varshney (1998), and Kruger (1974), wherein economic and caste interest groups 
can appeal to the state for protectionist or pro-poor policies in the name of equity or the 
highest good for society at large. Even Wade’s (1985) model shows how the Indian 
government, being a coalition government, is very much at the mercy of its voters, and 
therefore responds easily to the requests of such groups. 
Gunnar Myrdal (1971) offers a view different from the previous three scholars by 
focusing not on the relationship between groups and the state, but precisely the opposite: 
the relationship of the state with its citizens as per its obligations in governance. Myrdal’s 
(1971) conception is that India was dependent on democratic planning, where the public 
at large would help design and implement developmental projects voluntarily. One 
dilemma he highlights in the execution of democratic planning is that people may not be 
able to see the necessity of state development and may therefore choose not to support 
programs; in other words, it may remain unclear to them how state involvement could 
improve their conditions and reduce inequity. As a result, the Indian government has had 
to lead the planning and implementation of infrastructure on its own. However, it has had 
to do this while also managing the various pressures from a number of interest groups. 
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Myrdal (1971) highlights additional dilemmas with democratic planning, which 
has resulted in the ‘subsidy raj’ that is India today. While the goal of democratic planning 
was always to bring about rapid progress, he feels that perhaps India’s starting position as 
an extremely large and poor country hinders makes such a goal unrealistic, especially 
when India’s position is compared to other developing countries. Myrdal (1971) also 
touches on the design of planning: should programs be universal, or should they be 
targeted? How pervasive should its efforts be, especially at the village level? How can 
villagers be made to understand the objective and execution of programs and voluntarily 
participate in them? He raises all these important policy questions that determine the 
extent of the Indian state’s involvement in all levels of government. On the one hand, the 
Indian state may be able to see how to tread down the path of development to benefit the 
maximum number of citizens, especially disadvantaged citizens. However, if it cannot 
convince its constituents of this, they may not feel enough ‘ownership’ of government 
programs. The policies might then feel forced on citizens, rather than being embraced and 
improved upon in complementary relationship as conceptualized by Myrdal (1971). 
Myrdal’s (1971) criticism of the Indian state is that always tries to appease the 
demands of its citizens, but this creates a pretense of democracy, since it responds only to 
those groups that can become sufficiently powerful to necessitate governmental response. 
This is a problem because India is an extremely heterogeneous society, and, as Varshney 
(1998) mentions above, ethnic tensions are more pervasive socio-economic ones. This 
predisposes the formation of interest groups along ethnic lines, which ends up increasing 
equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome as proposed by Bardhan (2001). If 
the Indian state could become less soft and more disciplined, it would be able to create a 
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state that is more dependent on rule of law and regulation, facilitating the equality of 
outcome for all citizens by designing governmental programs to enhance the capabilities 
of all disadvantaged citizens. Myrdal (1971) points out that this may require some 
compulsive elements, which, though unfavorable in the short term, would probably leave 
the Indian state stronger and therefore better off in the long run, since it would not be as 
helpless against interest groups. 
 The last scholar discussed in this section is Ronald Herring (1999), who 
summarizes the various conceptions of the nature of the Indian state as suggested by the 
authors discussed in this paper, as well as others; Herring (1999) also discusses whether 
or not the Indian state fails in its developmental goals. He convincingly argues that India 
is a relative failure in that it did not succeed in achieving its own objectives via pro-poor 
policies. Moreover, between 1950 and 1980, India was only growing at about 3.5% per 
annum, well below the 4.9% of other developing countries and the global rate of 4.1% 
(Herring 1999, 310). On the other hand, like Varshney (1998), Herring (1999) also notes 
that independent India started off with many problems to address: poverty, low 
agricultural productivity, and geopolitical troubles, especially with Pakistan. Compared to 
its former colonial self, the Indian state today is actually doing quite well. It is arguably 
unfair to compare India to other developing economies because it is a continental 
country; some Indian states are as large as or larger than countries, especially the East 
Asian countries to which India is often compared. India’s lower growth rate and therefore 
perhaps limited appearance of success should therefore be understood more from its 
conservative position as a more socialist, state-led developmental state, rather than 
having a free-market economy vulnerable to capital volatility (as the Asian tigers 
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discovered in an economic crisis). At the time of Indian independence, the development-
oriented state seemed to naturally be one that would be led by the state, though by the 
time this model failed by the mid 80s and early 90s, India was ready to turn to the free-
market. The 1991 crisis in particular, which forced India to turn to the IMF, allowed for 
some structural reform as mandated by IMF conditionality. 
Through the presentation of several authors’ conceptions of the Indian state the 
relationship it has with its citizens, some essential features come through. First, as 
Bardhan (2001) and Varshney (1998) discuss, there are various kinds of interest groups in 
the Indian state that pressure it into giving specific subsidies that do not work well. At 
best, they create equality of opportunity, but not equality of outcome. Wade’s (1985) 
model explicitly accounts for this competition between interest groups as a competition 
for resources, though other perspectives, particularly that of Bardhan (2001) and 
Varshney (1998), implicitly highlight this competition in the creation of interest groups 
that lobby the government for various benefits. The second essential feature is that the 
competition between interest groups facilitates corruption (Wade 1985) and rent-seeking 
behavior (Krueger 1974) that are ultimately are not in the best interest of society at large 
and perpetuate inefficiency in many levels of governance. The third feature is highlighted 
by Myrdal (1971): the Indian state is a developmental state that is unable to engage its 
citizens in the developmental process and instead falls prey to the pressures of interest 
groups, on whom it is dependent for political survival (Herring 1999, 315). As I have 
tried to argue in this paper, India needs to overcome its extreme softness and push ahead 
with programs that are not targeted at interest groups but are instead more universally 
accessible. Doing so will better advance India’s developmental objectives, enhance the 
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equality between citizens of all socio-economic classes, castes, and ethnicities, and 
reduce the inefficiency that surrounds current developmental (subsidy) policies.  
Chapter 3: The Choice Between Subsidies and Cash Transfers 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the nature of the relationship between the 
Indian state and its citizens. The consensus that has emerged across scholars is that the 
Indian state, being very receptive to its citizens, caters to a variety of interest groups 
organized by identity or economic status. As a developmental state, India has undertaken 
a number of programs (referred to schemes) in an effort to improve the conditions of 
citizens’ lives in a number of critical areas such as education and health. Presently there 
are 1259 such schemes, of which 581 schemes are partially or fully funded by the central 
government.10 Amartya Sen (1999) mentions briefly that because the Indian state is a 
democracy, it is, out of necessity, sensitive to public criticism and has the incentive to 
prevent serious catastrophes like famine (Sen 1999, 16). Being a democracy, there is 
naturally ample room for citizens to interact with the government, and this gives citizens 
a legitimate avenue to demand more developmental assistance. In looking at the 581 
schemes (which I will explore in the next chapter), I found that the Indian government is 
at least trying to do just that. The usage of schemes (and subsidies) undoubtedly gets a 
bad reputation because many are poorly implemented, but that should not detract from 
the fact that the objective and missions of many schemes are well intentioned, and that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The schemes may be found here: http://www.india.gov.in/my-government/schemes. To find out which 
schemes had any funding from the central government, I selected “central” next to “sponsored by” and then 
clicked search. 
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the Indian government is indeed attempting to improve its levels of development. In fact, 
there are successful cases, but they simply do not get enough press compared to the 
schemes that fail. Many schemes can and do work; I witnessed firsthand how the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) worked well in supplementing 
the income of the poor with 100 days of paid work per year. The success can be 
dependent on a number of factors. For example, I observed that NREGS worked better in 
parts of Rajasthan and how it was not as successful in Haryana.11 The success or failure 
was in part determined by regional differences in development and access to alternative 
work. The villages I visited in Haryana were closer to industrial businesses that paid 
better than work under NREGS, so it was not as widely used as in the village I saw in 
Rajasthan. While the effectiveness of schemes is an entirely different subject that I will 
not pursue in this paper, it is important to note that the failure of some schemes in some 
places should not be used to make the sweeping generalization that all schemes are ‘bad’ 
all across India.  
The two primary ways in which countries pursue developmental aims are via 
subsidies, targeted at certain groups, and via cash transfers (more specifically, via 
conditional cash transfers). Between subsidies and cash transfers, cash transfers have a 
much better reputation because of their successful use in Brazil (through Bolsa Familia) 
and Mexico (Oportunidades) (Kapur 2011). Unfortunately for India, conditional cash 
transfer schemes are reliant on infrastructure to work well and are not yet a suitable 
standalone policy choice. For example, India still lacks functioning infrastructure; it 
could not have a program where families would get a cash transfer for getting children 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 I visited the village of Phalooda, Silora Block, Ajmer District in Rajasthan and the villages Raniaki and 
Tauru in Tauru Block, Mewat District, Haryana. 
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vaccinated at a health center if there were no health centers nearby to administer these 
vaccinations. The fact that conditional cash transfer programs are dependent on 
infrastructure to work well sometimes gets lost in the comparison between India and 
Latin America; the relative success of conditional cash transfer government assistance 
programs relative to the previous and more common subsidy contributes to the notion 
that subsidies are somehow ‘bad’ because they are ineffective. Though there is often 
comparison between subsidies versus cash transfers as if they are two separate things, it 
is perhaps more accurate to consider cash transfers as a type of subsidy. Both subsidies 
and cash transfers are forms of government assistance to citizens; what differentiates 
them is how they are designed and what they offer. Both subsidies and cash transfers can 
make for good policy under certain conditions, and this section will now look at each in 
more detail to determine the weaknesses of each type of policy that a state has to consider 
when choosing between the two. 
Errors of Targeting 
 Government schemes in India often attempt to target the poorest of the poor. The 
CIA World Factbook (2013) 2010 estimate for the number of people living below 
poverty in India was as much as 29.8%. Out of a population of over 1.2 billion people, 
this translates into more than 363 million people living below poverty – a number greater 
than the entire population of large countries like the United States! Undoubtedly, trying 
to target select groups rather than the entire population has, from this perspective, one 
important driving factor: the need for economic efficiency. Government schemes are 
known to be a strain on government expenditure; see, for example, the expenditure on the 
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three largest groups, fertilizer, food, and oil subsidies, in the Indian budget.12 The idea of 
targeting, then, is to minimize the economic strain by trying to deliver benefits only to the 
intended groups and minimizing wastage that comes from covering people not in the 
target group. However, studies seem to suggest that targeting is not actually more 
economically efficient, nor is it more precise in reaching the intended beneficiaries.  
 Cornia and Stewart (1995) discuss two common errors of targeting: E-mistakes, 
wherein programs provide excess coverage (to those not actually targeted by the scheme), 
and F mistakes, the failure to cover intended beneficiaries. The section below will discuss 
in detail examples of both types of mistakes. However, Cornia and Stewart (1995) 
studied several states’ programs and drew some important conclusions. The first was that 
F-mistakes tended to be lower in universal programs, better reaching the intended 
beneficiaries of programs. In terms of precision, then, universal programs seem to do 
better. Moreover, there are fewer E-mistakes in universal schemes, since E-mistakes are 
really just leakages of benefits to unintended beneficiaries; if the group of beneficiaries is 
expanded to everyone or almost everyone, then very few people will fall into the category 
of unintended beneficiary (Cornia and Stewart 1995, 363). Luckily, there are two ways to 
minimize targeting errors (E-mistakes especially) in universal or quasi-universal 
schemes: either targeting by commodity (for example, types of food preferred by lower 
income groups) or by geographic region (for example, the poorest and most 
underdeveloped villages). Both of these strategies can be used well to reduce E-mistakes 
without significant increasing F-mistakes (Cornia and Stewart 1995, 368). There are also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Union Budget and Economic Survey. “Non-Plan Expenditure by Broad Categories.” 
<http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2013-14/eb/stat04.pdf> 2013. Accessed 23 April 2013. This website offers 
digital access to the Indian budget from 1996-1997 onwards. 
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more indirect ways to recover the costs of E-mistakes, as by increasing taxes on goods 
consumed by the unintended, economically better-off beneficiaries. This does require 
some effort because the identified goods also need to have a lower elasticity of demand – 
that is, the prices of the selected goods cannot be too sensitive to changes in price.  
Moreover, the identified goods must have more progressive tax distributions so as to not 
increase the burden on the poor (Cornia and Stewart 1995, 380). Such methods further 
reduce the expense of E-mistakes while keeping F-mistakes lower, thereby creating 
schemes that are more precise in reaching intended groups and while reducing the 
economic strain on the government. 
Though many discussions give the impression that universal schemes are worse 
because of leakages, they are in fact better in some situations (for example, in food-based 
schemes) where the policy choice is in favor of reaching the poorest – the target group. 
The trade off here is the additional burden of expense on the government (if the program 
transitions from targeted to universal, for example), but given that the overall expenditure 
can be reduced by other strategies as mentioned above, most of the costs could be 
recouped down the line. Therefore, the universal scheme is more expensive, at least 
initially, but also more effective. Moreover, targeted schemes seem to have greater 
administrative costs than universal schemes, so a shift in perspective – saving on 
administrative costs in exchange for some E-mistakes – seems to be in order. Much of the 
discussion related on subsidies give the impression that other designs, such as cash 
transfers, are able to escape the problems of targeting. Unfortunately, this is not the case, 
and all types of programs reveal targeting errors. The objective, then, of government 
policy should be to design schemes that are appropriate for the desired objectives and are 
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optimal in terms of reach and cost. The choice between subsidies and cash transfers 
should not be understood as two separate choices but instead two ends on a continuous 
spectrum of policy. In chapter four, I will highlight how the Indian government has 
realized this, and many schemes have elements of both designs in many schemes, 
suggesting that the distinction made by scholars is not so clear in practice.  
The Problem with Subsidies 
There are a number of schemes implemented in India and across the world, with 
those of Latin America receiving much attention. In spite of that, I was surprised that 
most of the literature that I could find discussed only specific schemes, or only several 
related schemes. Therefore, this section will summarize the findings of scholars who 
looked at schemes in the food, energy, and agricultural policy areas. Before proceeding, I 
will say, as a disclaimer, that I will not look in depth at oil or fertilizer subsidies, which, 
along with food, make up a large proportion of the Indian budgetary expenditure, at least 
as far as subsidies are concerned. That would require a different approach to the paper, 
namely from a budgetary standpoint, where a researcher would examine the expenditure 
on subsidies (in the traditional sense) versus developmental programs across the years.13 
Still, even those subsidies have a developmental impact, so distinguishing the two would 
be difficult without a more precise definition. It would be a great contribution to the 
discussion on the nature of the Indian state if a scholar aggregated budget expenditure on 
subsidy versus developmental schemes, especially within the last 15 years or so, to 
determine from that angle whether or not India is truly a subsidy state or not. In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Budgetary expenditure information is available on http://indiabudget.nic.in/ going back to 1996-1997. 
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remainder of this section, I will explain in depth the problems of targeting that emerge 
from food, energy, and agricultural subsidies more broadly. 
Food 
    Food schemes are widespread in India, and they are used to try to generate minimum 
levels of health and wellbeing by advocating minimum nutritional standards. The most 
commonly discussed scheme is the Public Distribution System (PDS), wherein the Indian 
government offers limited quantities of specific foods at highly subsidized rates 
according to economic category (below poverty line or above poverty line, BPL and APL 
respectively). Of course the most obvious problem is one of information: how exactly 
does the government determine who lives above or below the determined poverty line? If 
the information that the government bases its decision on is incorrect, it leads to two 
common errors of targeting: inclusion errors, wherein the benefits of the program go to 
people that are not actually targeted by the program, and exclusion errors, wherein the 
intended beneficiaries are excluded by the program. Another conundrum that arises is 
that the condition of those slightly above the poverty line may only be marginally better; 
in this specific scheme, there is a separate rate for different food items for BPL and APL 
targets, so it is not a problem, but it is not always present in all schemes. Therefore, it is a 
critical point for policymakers to consider when designing programs. 
 Especially in the case of schemes where the benefits are material in form, a 
problem of distortion of information and/or of incentives often arises. For example, in the 
case of the PDS, not all of the beneficiaries may be aware of what the actual rates of the 
grains, pulses, and oils should be as per the scheme, and as a result, they may be 
overcharged when they buy their allotted amount of food. Additionally, because the food 
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is highly subsidized, there is an incentive for the shopkeepers to sell it instead into the 
general market at market price and profit that way; a second common strategy is to dilute 
the quality of the food distributed, or, in the case of rice and grains, to add rocks or stones 
when weighing the food so as to give the beneficiaries less food overall. This incentives 
problem is also apparent in the case of special hospitals that are built to treat poorer 
patients at little to no cost. Because the government provides infrastructure and support, 
the hospitals reap massive gains by functioning as regular hospitals (for profit) and face 
no apparent penalty for doing so (Kurian 2012). In both cases, the incentives of the 
implementing agent on the ground (the shopkeepers, in the case of the PDS) are not in 
line with the objective of the scheme, and so the intended beneficiaries lose out yet again 
while food gets leaked out of the system and diverted into the general market 
(Swaminathan and Misra 2001). 
 A problem related to the F-error of targeting is that schemes like the PDS are not 
easily accessible to all the intended beneficiaries. A substantial number of intended 
beneficiaries are excluded from food programs like the PDS simply because they cannot 
access it. Migrant workers, for example, often cannot provide proof of local residence 
and therefore cannot access the food from the ration shop, even though they are 
technically among the intended beneficiaries (Ramaswami 2002). There may simply not 
be a ration shop close enough to some people, which might particularly be the case for 
those living in more remote or hilly areas. When I was in India in Spring 2012, I 
discovered firsthand other problems related to accessibility. Many people simply have no 
way of knowing when the shop might be open (as it can often be open at the whim of the 
shopkeeper). The ration shop may also not have any stock left, or at all, since shipments 
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arrive once every two weeks, if at all. Ramaswami (2002) highlights that the poor often 
have very low savings rates, and they may not have enough money to be able to purchase 
and/or transport two weeks worth of food at a time. It may not even seem worth it to 
some beneficiaries to buy from the ration shop because of the lower quality of food. 
Additionally, the journey to buy the food can itself be a burden on beneficiaries – for 
example, the cost of transit, or the time taken to purchase the food (which often means 
forgoing a day of work). While some states like Tamil Nadu have gotten around this with 
sophisticated tracking systems to alert beneficiaries by text messages to their cell phone 
about when their shipment of food is in transit and arrives at the ration shop, it is an 
example of successful case and not at all the trend.  
 In spite of the problems of targeting, leakage, and accessibility, many scholars do 
still argue in favor of reforming the PDS, and indeed, scrapping the system would 
ultimately do more damage than good to the poorest that the program intends to benefit. 
This is important to remember, particularly since surveys have shown that people prefer 
to receive the material benefit to cash, since cash can easily be spent on other (non-food) 
goods (Khera 2011). An important element missing in many schemes, including food 
schemes, is a feedback mechanism whereby citizens can complain about quality or 
diversion of food, or otherwise give any useful feedback to improve the system. This is a 
critical element that can be added to improve the effectiveness of such programs and 
make better use of the government’s expenditure. Corruption problems can also be 
tackled by the use of technology, as illustrated above in the case of Tamil Nadu, wherein 
they were able to easily cut back on the waste, leakage, and diversion of food. The use of 
technology does come at the additional cost of maintenance and a degree of surveillance 
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over the system, which might further increase administrative costs, but it may be worth it 
if it can increase efficiency of the program in reaching target groups (Svedberg 2012). 
Some scholars argue in favor of more generous inclusion criteria, arguing that schemes 
that are universal or quasi-universal would at least benefit more of the intended groups. 
Moreover, generating more awareness of the schemes would help to cut back on some of 
the problems of corruption, such as selling the food to beneficiaries at the incorrect and 
sometimes purposefully inflated rates (Khera 2011). Controlling the quality and kind of 
foods offered through the scheme would allow for some measure of self-targeting within 
the system (Dutta and Ramaswami, 2011). All in all, there is room for improvement in 
the delivery of food assistance programs in the design and implementation, but these 
should be pursued rather than cutting back on such programs altogether.  
Energy 
 Like food, energy is another highly subsidized good in India. It is intended for the 
poor (who are typically of the BPL/APL groups), and in particular, the rural poor. Often 
times this takes the form of infrastructure, providing infrastructure for electricity, or by 
promoting the use of solar-operated products via generous subsidies and preferential 
loans arranged by the central government. 
Among the most commonly debated energy subsidy schemes is the LPG (liquid 
petroleum gas) subsidy. One of the objectives of such a scheme is to provide people with 
cleaner and better fuel, not only because it works better, but because it is better for the 
environment (because it can help prevent deforestation) and for respiratory health (fuel 
would not be as harmful as, say, cow dung, because it burns more cleanly) (Patra 2012). 
It is not a subsidy that is only targeted to the poor, but also to the middle class in both 
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urban and rural areas. Unfortunately, surveys have revealed that there is an urban bias in 
the accessibility of such programs – for example, a whopping 65% of urban households 
access LPG subsidies compared to a meager 12% of rural households (Lahoti, Suchitra, 
and Goutam 2013). This again points to a targeting problem, as we saw earlier in the case 
of food subsidies like the PDS. Such a bias appears in other sectors as well; Sreenivas 
and Sant (2008) discussed a similar problem in the context of transportation, where 
effectively, cars and two-wheelers get more subsidies than buses (not intended by policy 
design), which incentivizes their use over public transit. Accessibility, then, plays a big 
part in shaping the usage of schemes. 
 Of course, the problem has no easy solution. Some have argued it might be worth 
investing more in LPG to improve distribution; moreover, it would be possible to keep 
prices low either by subsidies, or by working with companies to increase the volume of 
LPG available in markets, thereby making the general price of LPG lower (Patra 2012). 
Another suggestion has been to instead offer more fuel-efficient cook stoves and give 
those to rural persons, changing the benefit from a monetary subsidy to a material one 
(Lahoti, Suchitra, and Goutam 2013). On this issue, in my analysis, I found something 
more akin to this second strategy through the presence of numerous schemes to promote 
solar products, which, if more widespread, would be a valuable supplemental program to 
the existing LPG subsidies as they are with the current urban-bias in accessibility.  
Agriculture 
The agricultural sector gets huge number of subsidies through a variety of 
government schemes that help transfer money, subsidized goods like fertilizer and 
essential farming tools like tractors, and training in better farming techniques. More 
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generally, agricultural subsidies have been written about so extensively, especially 
fertilizer, and it seems right to question whether or not agriculture gets too much of the 
government’s expenditure relative to other areas (Lalvani 2007). The debate surrounding 
agricultural subsidies comes into focus most clearly in the debate on fertilizer subsidies. 
Fertilizer subsidies are a form of input subsidies, along with water and electricity. 
These schemes are often targeted either to all farmers, or to small and marginal farmers. 
On the whole, marginal farmers, followed by small farmers, get most of the fertilizer 
subsidies (relative to their much smaller area), but Sharma and Thaker (2010) conclude 
that on the whole, fertilizer subsidies are distributed relatively equitably across the size of 
farms. The element of inequity, however, comes in geographic distribution, where in 
spite of being national level schemes, most of the benefits are funneled into five states – 
Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Punjab, which tend to 
in turn grow “fertiliser-intensive [sic] crops such as rice, wheat, cotton, and sugar cane” 
(Sharma and Thaker 2010, 74). Karnik and Lalvani (1996) pointed to the role of large 
agricultural interest groups, and the groups in these states in particular and their influence 
on subsidy policy is apparently strong, as is revealed by their higher receipt of benefit 
from schemes. Sharma and Thaker (2010) found, however, that although there are gaping 
inequalities in benefits of such between states, on the whole the inequality is declining. 
Consider that in 1992-93, Punjab consumed Rs. 946 per hectare of gross cropped area; in 
2007-08, this number was Rs. 3,924 per hectare. Rajasthan, the state that seems to get the 
least amount of the subsidies, the benefit was Rs. 129 per hectare in 1992-93 and Rs. 824 
per hectare in 2007-08. So, in comparing Punjab versus Rajasthan, in 1992-93 Punjab 
received about 7.3 times the amount of subsidy that Rajasthan did; by 2007-08 this 
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amount was reduced to 4.8 times the amount. Sharma and Thaker (2010) point to 
numerous improvements that came about with the help of government schemes: 
infrastructure, irrigation, high yield seeds, accessibility of fertilizer, and production of 
more fertilizer intensive crops in all the least developed states (Sharma and Thaker 2010, 
74).  Previously, scholars like Gulati and Kalra (1992) wondered if, by focusing more 
exclusively on certain types of schemes rather than others (for example, focusing more on 
irrigation versus fertilizers), the benefits of government schemes could be enhanced. 
However, Sharma and Thaker’s (2010) more recent results suggest that approaching 
agricultural development from all sides seems to be working and should be continued. In 
fact, they recommended against the policy of direct transfer of subsidies (i.e. a cash 
transfer versus the subsidized material good) because where would be no way to 
guarantee that the money would be spent on agricultural uses, and therefore the 
improvements seen in the last decade – slow, but surely steady, signs of improvement - 
might diminish. Rakshit (2005) also found that reduction and/or elimination of input 
subsidies would probably have a negative impact on growth and development at least in 
the short and medium term.  
The concerns surrounding agricultural subsidies seem to involve the choice of 
what to subsidize (for example, fertilizer versus irrigation versus both), how much to 
subsidize it, and how to distribute the subsidies more equitably (which deals in part with 
targeting). Gulati and Sharma (1995) note that subsidies impact peoples’ behavior, so the 
choice of what to subsidize will incentivize the use of subsidized options in part because 
they are cheaper. This can have impacts not only on the development of agriculture and 
productivity but also on the environment; the environment would be more adversely 
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impacted if the government were to be heavily subsidizing a more environmentally 
unfriendly nitrogen-based fertilizer, for example. Another well-argued point made by 
Shah (2005) is that subsidies only promote the enhanced use of the subsidized resource 
and may not really improve the efficiency or profitability of products. In other words, 
subsidies might create dependency rather than working toward the long-term goal of 
independence from subsidies. India must remember these important points in crafting 
developmental policy and consider how schemes help achieve short-term, medium-term, 
and long-term developmental goals. 
Summary of Problems of Targeting 
 Between the areas of food, energy, and agriculture, which get the most discussion 
by scholars, targeting was of course a prominent problem: richer versus poorer groups, 
urban versus rural groups, and even geographic distribution of benefits. The other 
common debate is selecting what to provide schemes for; in the case of agricultural 
subsidies, for example, the choice was between several different input subsidies. This 
debate is present in other policy areas as well. In the case of higher education, for 
example, Godbole (1997) argues that the benefits should be provided as a loan rather than 
as grant-in-aid for disadvantaged and poorer groups. On the other hand, Tilak (1993) 
argued the opposite point, pointing to the fact that the poor have more imperfect markets 
and may not be able to easily access loans. Moreover, the long-term benefit of increasing 
the number of skilled workers to enhance economic growth and development would be 
worth the input cost. Both of these arguments are valid; on the point of accessibility to 
loans, I personally found that while banks and post offices are far more accessible today 
than might have been the case in the 1990s, there remains an information problem 
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relating to the credibility of borrowers, which can explain why many of the schemes I 
analyzed in the following chapter (chapter 4) that had partial or full funding from the 
central government often had preferential loan components with lower interest rates. To 
not stray further from the point, each policy reflects making a choice between what seem 
to be two incompatible objectives: program success versus expenditure.   
Cash Transfers 
 Recently, cash transfers have surged in popularity, and successful cash-transfer 
programs in Brazil (Bolsa Familia) and Mexico (Oportunidades). The ‘standard’ subsidy 
has developed a bad reputation for itself because they are often wasteful (going to non-
targeted groups via leakages) and because they are ineffective in reaching their stated 
objectives in helping the poorest of the poor (Kapur, Mukhopadhyay, Subramanian 
2008). Several years ago, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh admitted that India had this 
very problem, emphasizing that “[India is spending] far too much money funding 
subsidies in the name of equity, with neither equity objectives nor efficiency objectives 
being met” (Manmohan Singh speech, 2007). Subsidies have come to be a problem 
because they are often brought about not only with important developmental aims, but 
also to appease electorates. Many a program has been created to assist the poor, but such 
benefits are many times only in name and not in practice. Moreover, because government 
schemes can be politically sensitive, most policymakers have no desire to approach the 
issue of subsidy reform and help facilitate adequate reform of programs (Lalvani 2012). 
This makes cash transfers seem appealing; many don’t realize they are another form of 
subsidy, so politicians can, to some extent, escape criticism for their support of subsidies 
by advocating for cash transfers. But are cash transfers a viable option in India? I will 
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argue that at least currently, given India’s current state of development, cash transfers 
will not work. I will briefly highlight some successes of cash transfers in India, as there 
are some cash transfer schemes that do work well. Then I will discuss the success of cash 
transfers in Mexico’s Oportunidades to illustrate that cash transfers can run into many of 
the same problems as subsidy schemes. Finally, I will explain the conditions under which 
cash transfer programs would be effective in India. 
First of all, India has already used a few cash transfer programs effectively. A 
study by Dutta, Howes, and Murgai (2010) showed how social pension schemes, where a 
small monetary transfer is made each month, actually do quite well in India. It’s true that 
the elderly might run into trouble setting up the benefits – they may have to bribe 
someone, for example, to get a bank account for themselves. This poses a heavy cost 
upon the beneficiaries up front if they do face such an obstacle. However, once the 
account it set up, pensions flow into the account on a monthly basis automatically. 
Moreover, the incidence of corruption and leakage seems to be low; this is probably 
because the monthly amount of cash put into accounts is so low (often less than 300 
rupees per month – roughly $5.50 US at the current rate). The low amount of the transfer 
seems to act as a disincentive to more corruption. Additionally, the target group is often 
quite small. The CIA World Factbook (2013) estimates that in 2013, roughly 5.7% of the 
Indian population will be over the age of 65.14 Less than 70 million people, then, could be 
potential targets. However, pension schemes often target the rural poor, and more often, 
widowed and elderly women with almost no income. Therefore, the target group is fairly 
small, especially compared to other schemes, so there are far fewer opportunities for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The projected estimate by gender is 32,992,850 males and 36,494,985 females age 65 and up. 
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corruption. The dynamics are simply quite different with a program like NREGS 
(National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) where project managers can forge 
names and signatures to earn hundreds of rupees per day, and it is hard to verify which 
names are real and which are phantom in a system that benefits potentially hundreds of 
millions of people. There are other, newer conditional cash transfer schemes in India that 
are focused on promoting the prevention of female feticide/infanticide. These work in 
tandem with other schemes that give girl children free education, essential material (e.g. 
uniforms, textbooks) and nutritional support; they are by no means standalone schemes, 
as might be possible in Latin America. So, on the whole, these schemes might give some 
amount of money when the child is delivered in an institution; there may be additional 
transfers for enrolling girl children in school and for each grade of schooling they 
successfully complete, especially in rural areas and in areas with especially high rates of 
female feticide (Roy 2011). An added benefit is that the money from these transfers may 
be ineligible for withdrawal until the girl reaches the age of 18, with an eye towards 
alleviating the cost of the girl’s marriage on the family. What this is an example of is how 
the number of schemes work together to incentivize the raising of girl children, which 
can slowly reduce the gender gap and begin shifting negative cultural attitudes towards 
girl children (Sekher 2012). The long-term impacts are still unclear, since many of these 
schemes have been initiated within the last decade. However, the far-reaching impact of 
these type of conditional cash transfer schemes gives hope to the successful use of other 
cash transfer and conditional cash transfer schemes in the future. 
However, the relative success of these programs in India and those in Latin 
America should be understood in context of their situation. For example, Yanes (2011) 
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discusses at length about the parameters of conditional cash transfers in the 
Oportunidades program in Mexico. He highlights the essential features of the program in 
comparison to subsidies. First, cash transfer and conditional cash transfer programs also 
have targeting problems (inclusion and exclusion errors). In the case of conditional cash 
transfers, beneficiaries have to make certain pre-determined choices in order to get the 
benefit, which can be a problem to the extent that such polices restrict freedom of choice 
because a policymaker at an upper, removed level decides that poor persons should be 
made to do x in order to receive a benefit. The drawback of having cash transfer schemes 
without any conditions, however, is that the resources transferred may be squandered, 
and might therefore not improve the conditions of the poorest overall; conditional 
transfers might be the lesser of the two evils in this situation. The transfers might create a 
sense of dependency even to the small sums of money transferred, but at the very least, 
one can hope to counter the mentality “that the poor make bad decisions and tend towards 
vagrancy, irresponsibility, laziness and vice” by means of the conditions imposed (Yanes 
2011, 51). Oportunidades is a transfer that goes to a family, not to an individual person, 
and often the transfer is made to a woman in the household to manage the resources best. 
As we noted in the case of cash transfer schemes in India, the transfers in Mexico also 
tend to be small sums and only to those persons with a low-income ceiling (India 
attempts to determine these ceilings by using the BPL/APL designation). Technology has 
improved the delivery of such transfers by cutting out middlemen who are known to 
extort the poor or cut out portions of benefits for themselves. The size of the transfers is 
small enough to deter many middlemen anyway, because there is little to gain. On the 
other hand, it can be problematic that the transfers are small since they also do not 
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prevent people from slipping into poverty; they are not social safety nets but temporary 
forms of assistance to attain certain aims (such as universal literacy and education for 
children of school-going ages) (Yanes 2011, 50). These aims can help families move out 
of poverty in the long run, barring other restrictions; sometimes, achievement of these 
aims is not enough, creating the problem of educated-unemployed persons trapped in a 
cycle of poverty (Dube 1997, 141). 
As we have seen above, cash transfer schemes are not perfect. They too run into 
the errors of targeting, and often there are conditional programs aimed at improving 
children’s health and education. However, implicit in the notion of conditionality is the 
notion that the necessary infrastructure exists for the program to work. Kapur, 
Mukhopadhyay, and Subramanian (2008) argue against using cash transfers in India, at 
least for now, because India is lacking the necessary infrastructure and institutions to 
make such programs work. Moreover, they point to the conditions as being a drawback; 
for example, under NREGS, it is true that many of the projects facilitate the development 
of infrastructure. However, the requirement that the local villagers make the 
infrastructure without any machinery creates less durable infrastructure on the whole. 
Dirt roads, for example, may be in bad shape after heavy rains and monsoons; what is the 
point of making such roads instead of properly paved ones that will last longer? Such 
projects may cost more initially (in material costs) but be less costly in the long run. 
Functional, long-lasting infrastructure is also important to the success of other schemes.  
I will give one critical example of the importance of functional infrastructure from 
a firsthand experience. Sarva Siksha Abhiyaan (a primary education scheme) mandates 
the creation of schools. However, mandating the creation of such infrastructure only goes 
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so far. In the village of Raniaki in Tauru Block, Mewat District, Haryana, I visited one 
school whose construction was incomplete because the money kept getting embezzled 
away. In addition to the infrastructure, the school did have some resources via material 
transfers from the government as well – books for education and also steel plates for the 
midday meal scheme created to incentivize school enrollment and attendance while 
increasing nutritional intake of children ages 6-14.  However, the books were locked 
away in a cabinet in one of the storage room and had clearly never been touched. Neither 
had the steel plates ever been used; I noticed both the books and plates as the plates were 
being extracted from the locked cabinet to serve my group a meal. No doubt, the school I 
visited in Raniaki was far from the environment needed to facilitate education; buildings 
and textbooks mean very little if the buildings are incomplete, the books locked away, 
and the teachers fail to show up.  
Under such conditions, a cash transfer scheme would do absolutely no good in 
increasing children’s enrollment or literacy rates, simply because the infrastructure is 
missing. Functional infrastructure is a necessary component of conditional cash transfer 
schemes, and it is only because Latin America does have the infrastructure that such 
programs are actually effective there. Therefore, India needs to continue to focus on 
innovating ways to actually ensure that functional infrastructure is installed; a cash 
transfer scheme cannot be envisaged, even for a moment, as a substitute program for any 
of the present schemes. It is, as best, a supplemental program (Editorial (no author), 
2011).  
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Closing Remarks 
 This section has discussed both subsidies and cash transfers, especially 
conditional cash transfers, which are widely used in Latin America. I first explored the 
problems of targeting, which include F-errors (excluding the intended beneficiaries) and 
E-errors (excess coverage of people not in the target group). I looked at the problem of 
targeting in three areas: food, energy, and agriculture, which all garner huge subsidies in 
India. Many of the problems revolve around lack of infrastructure, ease of access, choice 
of what to transfer, how much to transfer, and how to make sure targeted benefits actually 
reach intended beneficiaries. The lesson is that in many cases, targeted programs do not 
work well compared to universal programs. They often reach more urban than rural 
persons, and the administrative costs are higher. Though more universal programs work 
better, in choosing universal programs, a government implicitly makes the choice to place 
greater value in selecting a design that includes the targeted persons while willingly 
bearing the expense of excess coverage. This method can come midway, as there are 
strategies the government can use (for example, indirect taxes on select goods) to recoup 
some of the expenditure lost in schemes by excess coverage. Therefore, the universal 
option does seem, overall, to be the better policy choice. Of the methods of targeting, 
geographic targeting has been known to work better than targeting certain groups. Some 
targeted groups are actually quite large (for example, women), and hardly constitute a 
target group; instead they are more merely programs with a slightly restricted focus. 
Target groups should really be those groups that are fairly small, such as widowed 
women living below poverty line in rural areas. In spite of the surge of popularity of cash 
transfer programs thanks to their success in Latin America, they too cannot escape the 
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constraints of targeting. Based on findings on conditional cash transfer programs in Latin 
America, it is safe to say that conditional cash transfers work well in the appropriate 
conditions, and India should consider using them as supplementary programs after 
developing the requisite infrastructure. Alternative programs should be used to facilitate 
the development of adequate infrastructure; only with the infrastructure in place can 
conditional cash transfers work.  
 Bebbington and McCourt (2007) nicely summarize the features of programs that 
work well. Presumably the success of programs is dependent on Sen’s (1999) conception 
of successful programs: those that enhance the capability of the beneficiaries to do 
bigger, better things. Bebbington and McCourt (2007) found that programs that were 
successful in achieving that aim were those that targeted persons with the greatest 
capability deficits (which could be geographic targeting, as discussed earlier). Also, 
successful programs started small to iron out problems in implementation before being 
scaled up. India has certainly tried this strategy too, though it should perhaps extend the 
time between initial implementation and scaling up to several years in order to allow for 
schemes to undergo at least one series of reforms – a period of perhaps two to four years. 
During this period especially, feedback mechanisms must to be present and easily 
accessible to help policies pragmatically adapt to real situations. This also creates an 
opening for more actors – citizens, NGOs, and even private companies – to be a part of 
the developmental process. And finally, Bibbington and McCourt (2007) found that 
successful programs were those that had been around for at least ten years so as to be able 
to really identify the impact of welfare programs. Programs must be built to endure, so 
they should be developed carefully to be as successful as possible. 
	   41	  
 Although the discussions on cash transfers have ruled them out as a primary 
governmental strategy for India, the rise of cash transfer programs has at least helped to 
stimulate intellectual discussion on the differences between subsidies and cash transfers 
(Dubash and Rajan, 2001). Criteria like the one identified by Bibbington and McCourt 
(2007) also help shape the discussion of policy choice. This recent revival of debate has 
also encouraged other actors to bring the issue of development back under public scrutiny 
and help voters shift their attention to developmental issues, which can be especially 
important around elections. Of course, given the relationship between the state and the 
citizenry and the competition between more fractional interest groups, necessary reforms 
may only come slowly. However, the dynamic between the citizenry and the state may be 
evolving slowly in favor of performance-based politics. As citizens express more and 
more that basic development and infrastructure are important to them, it will be 
politically feasible and necessary for politicians to promise (and deliver) at least some 
benefits in these areas to the general public, necessitating a shift away from smaller 
interest groups (Keefer and Khemani 2004). Development has been an important issue in 
India as it is often compared to China, but such issues matter as much to India for its own 
sake in continuing to grow and find its place in the international arena.  
Chapter 4: Methodology and Results 
In order to determine whether or not India is a subsidy state or a developmental 
state, I decided to examine a range of schemes listed on the National Portal of India 
government website. Of the 1259 schemes listed, I opted to look at the 581 schemes with 
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central sponsorship because I was more interested in discovering what the data would 
suggest about the relationship between the citizenry and the central government. In 
centrally sponsored schemes, the central government of India covers 25%, 50%, 75%, or 
100% of the cost of the scheme.15 The National Portal of India has a brief description 
page for each scheme. I visited each scheme’s description page and collected my data.16 
In the first column is the name of the scheme. In the second column, I indicated which 
group(s) the scheme was targeted to (for example, certain castes, women, children, etc.). 
The third column lists whether or not the scheme is associated with a specific state – this 
corresponds with the ‘owner’ of a scheme on the scheme’s description page. The fourth 
column asks whether or not receipt of the benefits of the scheme is contingent upon 
anything, such as delivering a baby in a medical facility or attending school. If the answer 
was yes, I briefly listed what the condition was in the fifth column; if the answer was no, 
I left the column blank. The sixth column lists what types of benefits are delivered under 
each scheme. The five categories I used were money, employment, services, material, or 
infrastructure; many programs offered multiple benefits, so in the data presented below, 
the percentages do not add up to only 100%. Money could take the form of a direct cash 
transfer, a scholarship, a reimbursement, a loan, or partial coverage of costs for certain 
goods (a subsidy).  Services included things such as access to medical treatment at low or 
no cost or training to develop sector-specific skills. Material goods were a benefit that 
appeared in education or health schemes where the transfer was of school uniforms, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Not all schemes listed this percentage, and therefore, I did not include it in my data. 
16 I did occasionally run into difficulties in collecting this data. There were times where the scheme 
description did not provide the necessary information, which case I turned to the state government’s 
schemes page or a search engine to collect the necessary information. If no further information was 
available (or not in English), I made an educated guess based on similar schemes, since the title each 
scheme can tell quite a lot. 
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textbooks, or food.  The final categorization in this column was infrastructure, which I 
used to indicate that the government was developing infrastructure – for example, 
building schools or hostels – via the scheme. The seventh column describes the policy 
area relevant to each scheme, and the scheme could fall into more than one category. As 
with the previous, column, then, the results of this column presented below will also not 
add up to 100. The most populous categories were agriculture, education, health, 
infrastructure, and social welfare, where each category had 80 or more schemes. Most of 
the categories are obvious and therefore self-explanatory. However, there are two 
categories that merit explanation. One category I called development, which I used to 
indicate that the program was pursuing a very wide scope of developmental activities in 
too many areas. The other categorization worth mentioning are empowerment schemes. 
These schemes are often targeted to women, but also to other disadvantaged groups, and 
a common means of empowerment is via training or the formation of self-help groups 
(SHGs) for micro lending. 
The remainder of this chapter will proceed by describing the aggregate results 
sorted by each column. First, I will discuss my findings about the target groups of the 
scheme. Then I will examine the geographic distribution of these 581 schemes and 
suggest why they might be distributed as they are. Third, I describe my findings on the 
conditionality of schemes and break down the types of benefits that are transferred. 
Fourth, I will explain the different policy areas that the schemes were categorized into. 
This chapter will close with concluding remarks about my results. 
 
 
	   44	  
Target Groups 
 The first column of the data identifies the target group of the scheme. In a number 
of schemes, the target group was not the intended beneficiaries directly but rather an 
NGO or other voluntary organization who could carry out the objectives of the program. 
If the target group was the voluntary organization itself, the data lists it as such; however, 
if the end-beneficiary was a different group, then that group is the one listed. I will only 
present a selection of the target groups, pulling out some major ones that may be of 
interest. 
 The first interesting finding here is related to gender targeting, that is, targeting of 
women and/or girls. Women were targeted in 15.32% of schemes and girls (usually under 
age fourteen) in 6.9% of schemes. Collectively, then, females are targeted in 22.2% of 
schemes, or over one-fifth of the total schemes examined. While it is admirable that 
women in targeted in such a significant number of schemes, given that there are 587, 236, 
392 women and girls in India – 48.1% of the population – there is undoubtedly room for 
errors of targeting and too many access points (i.e. number of women) for corruption 
(CIA World Factbook 2013).  
 I examined two additional target groups here: the elderly and disabled and/or 
handicapped persons. As a target group, 12 of the 82 centrally sponsored schemes in the 
social welfare category were for the elderly. To put this number into perspective, the 
elderly (age 65 and up) constitute 5.7% of the population; there are 69, 487, 835 people 
over age 65 versus 165, 219, 615 girls under 14. So, given that the elderly are, 
comparatively, 42.1% the size of the population of girls under 14, it is surprising that they 
have 12 schemes (30% of the number of schemes directed to girls). However, the social 
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welfare schemes that apply to the elderly are almost always pensions (unconditional cash 
transfers) of fairly small sums (less than a few hundred rupees per month), so in terms of 
budgeting, social welfare programs for the elderly are probably more inexpensive. 32 
schemes are directed towards disabled and handicapped persons, 19 of which fall in the 
social welfare category. The remaining schemes are more focused on imparting skills or 
otherwise enhancing the capabilities of people with disabilities. These findings are 
summarized into table 1 below. 
 Table 1: Gender, Age, and Disability 
Target Group Number of 
Schemes 
Percent of Total 
Women 89* 15.32% 
Girls 40 6.9% 
Women and girls 5 .9% 
Elderly (60 and up) 12 2.1% 
Disabled/handicapped 32 5.5% 
* One of the programs targeted toward women was an umbrella scheme (National Social Assistance 
Programme – NSAP) and therefore contained an unknown number of additional schemes underneath it. 
 
 Another common method of selecting targeting was by selecting identity groups, 
which consist of several caste groups (Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Other 
Backward Class, Backward Class) and also religious minorities (Buddhists, Christians, 
Muslims, Sikhs, and Zoroastrians/Parsis). The findings related to identity groups are 
summarized in table 2 below. There are 107 schemes17 – 18.4% of all the schemes – 
directed at Scheduled Castes (SCs) or Scheduled Tribes (STs). Backward Classes (BCs) 
and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) have far fewer schemes directed toward them. If 
one combines the number of schemes directed at BCs and OBCs (39 schemes, 46 if the 
ones with no clear designation are included), then 6.7%/7.9% of schemes are targeted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Many of the schemes that target SCs also target STs; there is a lot of overlap. The number used here, 107, 
reflects the total number of schemes that targeted either of those two groups. 
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toward those two groups, less than half of the amount of schemes directed at SCs or STs. 
The 2001 census of India pegged the number of SCs at 16.2% of the population and STs 
as 8.2%, but there is no data on other caste groups. The 2011 census is the first census 
that asks questions about caste by popular demand, but the data is not available to draw 
comparisons on the amount of schemes directed to SCs, STs, BCs, and OBCs versus 
minority groups.18 Religious minorities, who constitute approximately 19.4% of the 
population, have 17 schemes directed toward them, though the nature of the schemes had 
nothing to do with their religious affiliation; 10 of the schemes were in the educational 
sector and directed towards educating minority children (CIA World Factbook 2013).  
Table 2: Identity Groups  
Target Group Number of 
Schemes 
Percent of Total 
Scheduled Caste 93 16% 
Scheduled Tribe 85 14.6% 
Other Backward Class 28 4.8% 
Backward Class 11/18* 1.9%/4.8%* 
Minorities  17 2.9% 
* An additional 17 schemes with broad categorizations like ‘rural people’ or ‘farmers’ that did not specify a 
caste group could also cover backward classes. 
 
 Next, I examined the usage of the term ‘poor’ or ‘below poverty line’ (BPL) as 
targeting categories and compared the usage of urban versus rural; these findings are 
summarized in tables 3 and 4. Without going into a full-fledged discussion about the 
difficulties surrounding the designation of BPL, it is worth noting that some argue that 
the BPL line should be higher (i.e. it is presently too low), while others say the 
designation has a degree of arbitrariness since people above the poverty line (APL) are 
not significantly better off but can be ignored by schemes because of the BPL 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See for example, “Demand for caste census rocks Lok Sabha.” Times of India, 4 May 2010.  
<http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-05-04/india/28307572_1_caste-based-enumeration-
demand-for-caste-census-decennial-census> 
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designation. 105 of the total number of schemes – 18.1% – are targeted to people who are 
‘poor’ or in the ‘BPL’ category.19 The lack of clarity of the definitions surrounding poor 
and BPL make it possible for coverage to be poor; the exclusion errors of such a target 
selection could be high. Almost three times as many schemes were directed at rural areas 
versus urban areas, where the incidence of poverty is more likely to higher. The urban 
schemes in particular were not always targeted at the poor, so I separated tables 3 and 4 
to make this clearer. The difference between the number of explicitly urban versus rural 
schemes suggests that the Indian government may be trying to use a strategy of 
geographic targeting in many schemes, at least to a limited degree. There are a few 
schemes that are actually directed at certain blocks or districts, but even at an aggregate 
level, the rural versus urban difference is worth noting in terms of geographic targeting. 
 
Table 3: Poor, Below Poverty Line, Urban and Rural 
Target Group Number of 
Schemes 
Percent of Total 
Poor 36 6.2% 
Below Poverty Line 76 13.1% 
 
Table 4: Urban versus Rural 
Target Group Number of 
Schemes 
Percent of Total 
Urban 27 4.6% 
Rural 97 16.7% 
 
 The final section under the target group column that I looked at was profession. 
There were three primary groups of interest: farmers, fishermen, and handloom weavers; 
the findings are summarized in table 5.20 The fact that almost 12% of schemes are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 There was, again, some overlap, so it was not 112 schemes in total. 20	  There were numerous other groups as well, but I highlighted the three largest ones here.	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directed to farmers alone (not only of crops but those engaging in animal husbandry as 
well) can attest to the high number of agricultural subsides in India; agricultural subsidies 
are among the most widely discussed Indian subsidies, and with good reason, since they 
represent a more significant percentage of the budget. Fishermen, who also fall under the 
commercial agriculture category, were the next largest target group, with 4.6% of the 
schemes targeted to them, followed by handloom/power loom weavers with 3.6% of the 
schemes. The textile sector in India is the second largest employer (second to 
agriculture), employing about 35 million people.21 Additionally, in 2008-2009 the 
handloom/power loom sector alone produced about 13% of the total cloth in India (India 
Law Offices 2009). Therefore, while its proportion may seem small here, there may be 
additional subsidies in other sectors of the textile industry (for example, in the production 
of cotton or jute) that are not reflected in this table. 
Table 5: Professions 
Target Group Number of 
Schemes 
Percent of Total 
Farmers 68 11.7% 
Fishermen 27 4.6% 
Handloom Weavers 21 3.6% 
 
Geographic Breakdown 
This section looks at the schemes according to which state or territory ‘owned’ 
the scheme. I will not discuss all 28 states and seven union territories, but all states and 
territories are listed in table 6 on the following page. The states that had the highest 
number of schemes (and therefore accounted for greater portions of government 
expenditure on schemes) were Orissa (60) and Himachal Pradesh (58), with each 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 No author. “A Brief Report: Textile Industry in India.” 2012.  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20120522071945/http://cci.in/pdf/surveys_reports/indian-textile-industry.pdf> 
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accounting for over 10% of the 581 centrally sponsored schemes. The next top states 
were Punjab (40), Jammu and Kashmir (34), Madhya Pradesh (30), and Mizoram (27). 
Among the union territories, Andaman and Nicobar Islands owned 12 of the schemes, 
which is significant considering its fairly small size and small population (379,944 
people) (Census of India 2011). Interestingly, all of the states receiving the highest funds 
are in the upper half of India – none of the top states are in southern India, and Madhya 
Pradesh is the only central Indian state represented in the top six states here. Many of  
these top six states rank low or medium in terms of development, though Himachal 
Pradesh and Punjab are far more developed than the other states represented here. Interest 
groups, especially related to the agricultural or textile sectors, may account for the 
distribution of funding; if schemes were skewed towards less developed states, then we 
would see states like Rajasthan or Bihar having more schemes targeted towards them. 
Table 6: Geographic Breakdown 
State/Union Territory Number of 
Schemes 
Percent of 
Total 
Central government (no 
specific state) 
18 3.1% 
Andhra Pradesh 12 2.1% 
Arunachal Pradesh 5 .9% 
Assam 1 .2% 
Bihar 3 .5% 
Chhattisgarh 8 1.4% 
Goa 5 .9% 
Gujarat 0 0% 
Haryana 12 2.1% 
Himachal Pradesh 58 10% 
Jammu and Kashmir 34 5.9% 
Jharkhand 20 3.4% 
Karnataka 1 .2% 
Kerala  18 3.1% 
Madhya Pradesh 30 5.2% 
Maharashtra 7 1.2% 
Manipur 26 4.5% 
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Meghalaya 16 2.8% 
Mizoram 27 4.6% 
Nagaland 0 0% 
Orissa (Odisha) 60 10.3% 
Punjab 40 6.9% 
Rajasthan 1 .2% 
Sikkim 2 .3% 
Tamil Nadu 2 .3% 
Tripura 3 .5% 
Uttar Pradesh 0 0% 
Uttar Pradesh 0 0% 
Uttarakhand  0 0% 
West Bengal 0 0% 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands 12 2.1% 
Chandigarh 5 .9% 
Dadra and Nagar Haveli 0 0% 
Daman and Diu 0 0% 
Lakshadweep 1 .2% 
National Capital Territory of 
Delhi 
1 .2% 
Puducherry 3 .5% 
 
Conditionality 
 Most Indian schemes deliver benefits on an unconditional basis. As table 7 shows, 
of the 581 schemes, 494 schemes (85%) are unconditional. 87 of the schemes were 
conditional, with the top form of conditionality being manual labor (21 schemes), paying 
into a program or partially financing a project (17 schemes), or attending school (12 
schemes). Conditionality is used mostly in instances where the benefit conferred is 
money (a cash transfer) or material (as in the case of education). It is not insignificant 
that 15% of schemes are conditional, but at the same time, their more limited use 
underlines the fact that many conditional schemes usually require infrastructure to be in 
place in order to be effective, as is the case in Latin America. Therefore, until India can 
successfully develop more parts of the country and install the necessary infrastructure 
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(functional schools, medical facilities, etc.), the use of cash transfer or conditional cash 
transfer programs will probably remain more limited.  
Table 7: Conditionality 
Conditionality? Number of 
Schemes 
Percent of Total 
Yes 87 15% 
No 494 85% 
 
 In order to better understand the choice between traditional subsidies versus cash 
transfers, I also disaggregated the data on type of benefits conferred in table 8. Most 
schemes offer multiple benefits. Money was offered in almost 72% of schemes in 
addition to one of the other four types of benefits, often training (services) or 
employment. Services such as training or access to low cost or free health care were 
available in 205 schemes, over one-third of the schemes. 150 schemes facilitated the 
creation of infrastructure, which, as I mentioned earlier, also points to the fact that the 
Indian government is still working to further develop infrastructure. Infrastructure 
constituted a benefit in 25.8% of schemes; I only counted it in cases where the central 
government was directly handling the building. There were many instances where the 
government was giving money towards building infrastructure (for example, giving 
money to NGOs to finance a variety of developmental projects which could potentially 
include infrastructure). In actuality, then, a greater proportion of schemes than is 
represented here goes towards infrastructure. Material benefits and employment/self-
employment opportunities were each benefits in close to 10 percent of schemes. In the 
case of material goods, their more limited use might point to the fact that Indian 
lawmakers are aware that material goods are easily siphoned away from the intended 
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beneficiaries. However, food is also a material good, so although it is only 10% in terms 
of the number of schemes, central expenditure on material benefits are likely to be high. 
Employment is a particularly helpful benefit, as through programs like the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). I witnessed firsthand in Phalooda village in 
Silora Block, Ajmer District, Rajasthan, in February 2012, how employment is an 
empowering benefit for many reasons. In Phalooda, most of the people who took 
advantage of employment under NREGS were women. The projects created under 
NREGS were close enough to or even within the village, which made it easier for the 
women in this conservative area to take up work; they are often not allowed to venture 
very far from home, as men can. Additionally, as a result of working and contributing to 
household expenses, women in this village were empowered and began to have more say 
in village affairs; they also tried to make good use of the money by saving portions of it 
in a self-help group. The presence of women’s self-help groups in this area has better 
facilitated their empowerment. Therefore, though employment is a limited benefit under 
this scheme (only up to 100 days of work), money-for-work schemes like this can have a 
great benefit even with respect to social development. The added perk of this program is 
that it is considered to be self-targeting; only those people willing to take up manual work 
will enroll in the scheme. Of course, it is not perfect; the scheme does not work so well 
everywhere, and lots of money is still squirreled away by corruption. Still, the success of 
NREGS in terms of both awareness and usage suggests that more programs should make 
use of well-designed conditions to benefit Indian citizens in multiple ways. 
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Table 8: Benefits by Type 
Benefit Type Number of 
Schemes 
Percent of Total 
Employment 56 9.6% 
Infrastructure 150 25.8% 
Material 57 9.8% 
Money 416 71.6% 
Services 205 35.3% 
 
Policy Areas 
 The final column to look at here is the breakdown of policy areas, summarized by 
table 9. India has been working to improve literacy rates and is trying to provide 
universal education at least at the primary school level; in line with this objective, almost 
21% of schemes are related to education. Agriculture comes as a close second with 
17.7%, followed by health (15.7%), infrastructure (14.6%), and social welfare (14.1%). 
The benefits of these areas do have a lot of overlap, since the expansion of infrastructure 
is happening in multiple areas via the commercialization of agriculture and the 
construction of schools and adequate medical facilities in areas across India. The 
percentage of different schemes here should not be confused for the relationship with 
budgetary expenditure; agriculture, for example, is the second-largest policy area 
covered, but it includes fertilizer subsidies, which makes agriculture an area of greater 
expenditure than some of the other policy areas. Regardless, each of these top areas 
constitutes a critical developmental area for India, and because the central government 
sponsors a significant number of schemes in each category, I would argue that it is more 
plausible to believe that India is not merely a subsidy state but a developing one.   
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Table 9: Policy Areas 
Policy Area Number of Schemes Percent of Total 
Agriculture* 103 17.7% 
Development 22 3.8% 
Education 122 21% 
Empowerment 50 8.6% 
Energy 25 4.3% 
Health  91 15.7% 
Human Capital Development 25 4.3% 
Industrial Development 66 11.4% 
Infrastructure 85 14.6% 
Social Welfare 82 14.1% 
* 51 Schemes (8.8% of schemes) were toward small-scale agriculture; 52 (9% of schemes) were toward 
commercial agriculture. 
Closing Remarks 
This chapter has discussed the findings of my all-India aggregated data on 
centrally sponsored government schemes. I was able to identify a number of target groups 
that appeared in a significant number of schemes, namely women, Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, rural areas, and farmers/fishermen. These overlap with India’s 
developmental interests, which include empowering women and improving the quality of 
life in part by developing infrastructure for the poorest people, many of who are SCs or 
STs and live in rural areas. The top states in terms of distribution were Orissa, Himachal 
Pradesh, Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, and Mizoram; though many of 
these are lesser developed states, the presence of more well-developed states like 
Himachal Pradesh and Punjab suggests that there is a different relationship between these 
states and the central government relating to developmental aims (for example, 
commercialization of agriculture and diversifying sources of growth) – interest groups in 
key areas are likely to have more influence, then, in accordance with the central 
government’s developmental objectives. Those states may have certain industries that are 
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of interest for economic growth (for example, textiles or agriculture). I also found that 
85% of schemes were not conditional, which reflects that conditional schemes, 
particularly conditional cash transfer schemes that are widely used in Latin America, are 
not yet suitable for many parts of India. Money, services such as vocational training, and 
the development of infrastructure in the top policy areas of education, agriculture, 
infrastructure, social welfare, and health suggest that the Indian state is not merely trying 
to create an ever-rising number of subsidies and schemes. With almost 1300 schemes 
between the central and state governments, India has no shortage of programs to work 
through. My findings suggest that at the very least, scholars should re-examine why India 
is typically believed to be a ‘subsidy state’ or a ‘subsidy raj.’ As I mentioned in chapter 3, 
approaching the notion of a subsidy state by looking at the expenditure on subsidies 
versus other developmental projects in the last decade or so would be one way to go 
about doing this. I believe, however, that my findings point to the fact that India is a 
developing state, targeting the most disadvantaged groups in numerous developmental 
policy areas using a strategy of conferring multiple types of benefits. While the 
development of programs can improve to be more universally accessible, it seems that 
India’s development will continue at a slow and steady pace, which will help as India 
takes its place on the international stage.  
Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks  
 The introduction of this paper highlighted that although the Indian state is often 
considered to be a subsidy raj, whether or not this is actually true has not yet been 
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analyzed. Furthermore, I was guided by Sen’s (1999) concept of development as a means 
and an end of enhancing not only economic growth but also the capability of people to 
live better lives and therefore increase their freedoms. Using that understanding of 
development, I looked at whether or not the definitions available of subsidy include any 
developmental references, which they do not. Though many Indian schemes do have 
subsidy components in the sense that there are transfers of money, directly in the form of 
cash or indirectly via below-market prices for particular goods and services, Indian 
schemes also deliver a number of other benefits that are intended to have a developmental 
impact. To that end, I decided to look at 581 centrally sponsored schemes to determine 
what the benefits of Indian schemes are and to determine on that basis whether it would 
be appropriate to call India a subsidy state. Based on my findings, I feel that it may be 
misleading to call India a subsidy state, since such a label does not capture the 
developmental objectives or impacts of such schemes.  
The label of ‘subsidy state’ does not suggest anything about the nature of the 
relationship between the Indian government and its highly diverse populace, which I 
explored in chapter two. A number of scholars pointed out that the highly heterogeneous 
and fractalized Indian populace forms interest groups in an effort to lobby the 
government and reduce the inequalities between different groups. The Indian state, being 
a soft state and more politically sensitive in that it cannot afford to displease any groups, 
responds easily to the lobbying of such groups. The fact that developmental schemes 
come through such response show the government’s objectives are, at least in part, aimed 
at increasing equity between different groups and enhancing the capability, and therefore 
freedom, of more disadvantaged groups. The Indian state, then, can be considered to be a 
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developmental state. The competition between interest groups for government response 
can bring about corruption and rent-seeking behavior, but as Wade (1985) reveals, a 
minimum level of corruption may be a good thing in that it keeps the entire governing 
system in motion. That isn’t to say that India has low levels of corruption; it is a serious 
problem that needs to be reduced, but not entirely eliminated. 
The criticism, then, associated with labeling India as a subsidy state, might not be 
that India is not a developmental state, but that it has failed in its own developmental 
objectives. Chapter three talks about this in great depth in explaining the choice between 
subsidies and cash transfers. Both types of policy cannot escape the problem of targeting, 
which are E-errors of excess coverage and F-errors of excluding the target groups. Such 
errors can be overcome by using universal or quasi-universal programs, or by targeting 
all citizens in select geographic areas rather than only sub-groups of people. If the 
transfer is of material goods, the types of goods transferred might be those more used by 
the target groups (for example, coarser cereals that are consumed more readily by those 
in rural versus urban areas). The trade off here might be cost, but on the other hand, 
targeting creates higher administrative costs. For example, women are not an ideal 
population to target; they are a large portion of the Indian population (a little under 50%), 
and therefore create too many access points for people to draw benefits (i.e. there are 
many possible points for corruption). Given that many schemes target fairly large groups, 
it is difficult to determine who to include or who to exclude. Therefore, targeted schemes 
are generally less effective (except in instances where target groups are fairly small), so 
may be better for the government to bear the higher costs of universal programs if it 
means that those schemes have a greater developmental impact. Additionally, the 
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government does have ways to reclaim some of the surplus expenditure, which should 
encourage the government to try universal programs. Cash transfer programs, especially 
conditional cash transfer programs, have great appeal because of their success in Latin 
America, but because they require infrastructure to function well, they are not yet a 
suitable policy option for India, which is still figuring out how to develop much of its 
infrastructure.   
 Bearing in mind the two primary policy choices, subsidies and cash transfers 
(which are in fact on one continuum of policy choice), chapter four describes the process 
of my data collection and presented some analysis of results. For example, the population 
of many of the target groups – women, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, farmers, etc. 
– are groups whose capabilities and freedoms the government is trying to enhance. 
However, the many centrally sponsored schemes went to one of six states: Orissa, 
Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, and Mizoram. Some 
of these are among the least developed states in India, but not all of them are; Himachal 
Pradesh and Punjab fare much better than the other four top states. This suggests that the 
influence of interest groups may be at play here, as discussed in chapter two, but also that 
the relationship between these states and the central government may be unique as they 
relate to developmental aims, such as commercialization of agriculture and 
diversification of the sources of growth. Consistent with the conclusions of chapter three, 
only 15% of schemes had any conditionality, pointing to the fact that conditional schemes 
are not yet appropriate for India without the necessary infrastructure. However, while 
almost 72% of schemes offered money, they also offered a number of other benefits, 
namely material goods, employment, services, and/or infrastructure. By offering multiple 
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types of benefits, it seems more plausible that the Indian government is not simply trying 
to subsidize everything or throw money at the problems of poverty and unfreedom, but 
instead it is trying to improve the lot of citizens by offering a multitude of benefits, if 
only in hopes that at least some will have some positive impact. 
 With the understanding of the complex nature of the relationship between the 
Indian state and its citizenry and the decisions it has to make when designing and 
executing policy, I undertook the project of analyzing centrally sponsored schemes. It is 
my belief that the results of my findings necessitate a reassessment of the nature of the 
Indian state as a subsidy state, and that it should instead be called a developmental state. 
Of course, there are necessary reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
Indian schemes, but it is still squarely the job of the government to protect and enhance 
the freedoms of all its citizens. This it should do not only as the obligation of a 
democratic government to its citizens, but also because only in doing so will India be able 
to sustain economic growth and innovation as it rises to take its place on the global stage. 
Such a goal cannot be achieved without the increased participation of all citizens in the 
Indian and the global economy, which requires the Indian government to not only 
eradicate income poverty but also the poverty of capabilities. India will have to feel its 
way forward as it attempts to advance its developmental objectives, enhance the equality 
between citizens of all socio-economic classes, castes, and ethnicities, and reduce the 
inefficiency that surrounds current developmental policies.  
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